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‘The “Community method” is allegedly being threatened by the 
encroachment of the “intergovernmental method” … In my opinion, 
that is a false argument.’ 
 
Address given by the President of the European Council, Herman Van 
Rompuy, at a conference organised by Notre Europe  
on 20 September 2010 at Sciences-Po, Paris 
 
 
 
 
 
The Treaty of Lisbon  
or intergovernmental temptation?* 
Dusan Sidjanski1 
 
This question goes to the very heart of the European project: it is 
fundamental for the future of the European Union and its role in the world. 
The Treaty of Lisbon emerged from the ashes of the European 
Constitution. Driven forward by Angela Merkel, as President of the 
European Council, Nicolas Sarkozy and José Manuel Barroso, the main 
advances made in the Constitution were preserved at the expense of a few 
concessions and symbolic sacrifices in order to make the Union more 
effective and more democratic. 
The innovations introduced by the Treaty of Lisbon alter the division of 
responsibilities and powers within the European Union. On the one hand, 
they aim to strengthen some institutions at the expense of the previous 
balance. On the other hand, they aim to shake up the use of the 
Community method by creating a permanent Presidency of the European 
Council and by entrusting a dual task to the High Representative, who 
assumes both the Presidency of the Foreign Affairs Council and the Vice-
Presidency of the Commission. From the outset, the Union has clearly 
suffered as a result of the gulf between the European Community and 
political cooperation, both in the Single European Act and in the Treaty of 
* This article is the sole responsibility of the author.  
1 Professor Emeritus at the University of Geneva, President of the European Cultural Centre.  
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Maastricht. In narrowing the gap between these two areas – one based on 
the Community method and the other more intergovernmental – we have 
good reason to wonder what the consequences of this close cohabitation 
will be. Debate about these two methods and how they interact is not only 
legitimate but also unavoidable, all the more so as the current crisis 
requires commitment on the part of the political leaders of the Member 
States. Reopening this debate should give us a clearer understanding and, 
if possible, help us to enhance the Union and make it a fully-fledged global 
player. 
The Brussels European Council laid bare the traditional divisions, 
heightened by the diversity of the Union of 27 Member States. Since the 
Hague Congress in 1948, the United Kingdom, true to its traditional policy, 
has led a group of countries which fully support the intergovernmental or 
cooperation method as opposed to the Franco-German pairing and the 
euro area countries, which prefer the Community or federal method2. These 
divisions, which vary according to the interests of the Member States or 
sector-based interests, intersect with the battle lines drawn on the issue of 
the priority to be given to deepening as opposed to enlargement, to political 
Europe as opposed to market-focused Europe. The main lesson emerging 
from the debates and confrontations is that, despite the decline in 
Community spirit, the assertion of national interests and the resistance of 
Prime Minister Blair and the Polish President, the troika has managed to 
revive the European dynamic. This success highlights the fundamental role 
played by both individual figures and the European Council consisting of 
the Heads of State or Government and the President of the European 
Commission. The European Council and its dynamic core have now 
asserted themselves as the highest political authority in the European 
Union. 
To what extent has the Treaty of Lisbon managed to maintain the balance 
between the Community institutions – the European Parliament, the 
Commission and the Court of Justice – and the intergovernmental 
institutions – the European Council and the Council of the European Union 
– particularly as, at first sight, the big winners are the European Parliament 
on the one hand, and the European Council and the Council on the other? 
The position of the Court of Justice as the judicial power has been 
strengthened, whereas the Commission does not seem to have gained any 
visible benefit from the new division of powers. However, its right of 
proposal has been extended in line with the extension of codecision, and it 
2 At the Hague Congress « unionists » were opposed to « federalists ». Is Germany shifting 
today away from the federal method towards the unionist approach despite its federal expe-
rience?  
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remains the institution with the greatest capacity for analysis and action. 
The question is whether the European Council, which has been given more 
authority, will draw inspiration from the Community model of the Council, by 
taking decisions on a proposal or recommendation from the Commission, 
or whether it will adopt an approach relying more directly on its members. 
As regards External Affairs and relations between RELEX and the CFSP,   
the High Representative, Baroness Ashton, has bridged the gap between 
these two areas, with the common foreign and security policy (CFSP) and 
defence policy being ‘sovereign’ areas par excellence. 
Does this ambitious reform lean towards the federal approach, and is it 
inspired, to some extent, albeit unintentionally, by the federative spirit, 
method and principles? Initial answers will be provided when we see how 
the Treaty of Lisbon works in practice. For now, the running-in period, 
which is taking place against a background of financial and economic crisis, 
is giving a few indications. However, the quest for unprecedented 
European federalism is continuing3. To test this assertion, we propose to 
assess the new division of powers, to examine the cases of External Affairs 
and the task force chaired by Herman Van Rompuy, and to try to determine 
the direction of the first steps being taken under the Treaty of Lisbon. 
 
On the intergovernmental institutions 
A major innovation: the President of the European Council 
The European Council, consisting of the Heads of State or Government 
and the President of the Commission, has been given a permanent 
President and its own role in the Union’s political system has been 
reinforced. According to this system’s logic, the more the Union’s work 
involves problems of increasing political importance, the greater the need 
for its leaders to become involved. Issues of ‘high politics’ involving 
sovereign powers, such as currency or economic or external policy, require 
commitment on the part of the European Council members. At the same 
time, globalisation, multipolarity and the rise of the emerging powers 
alongside the United States demand greater unity in external policy if the 
Union is to assert itself as a global player and legislative power. That is why 
a permanent President is needed. 
Electing the President by a qualified majority avoids any vetoes and 
facilitates consensus, as in the case of Herman Van Rompuy. He is 
3 Compare Sidjanski, D., L’Avenir fédéraliste de l’Europe, Paris, PUF, 1992; Sidjanski, D., The 
Federal Future of Europe, University of Michigan Press, 2000; and Sidjanski, D., L’approche 
fédérative de l’Union européenne ou la quête d’un fédéralisme européen inédit, Notre Europe, 
2001. For further references, see the website www.dusan-sidjanski.eu  
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responsible for chairing and driving forward the work of the European 
Council, and also for ensuring the preparation and continuity of this work in 
cooperation with the President of the Commission and on the basis of the 
work of the General Affairs Council. He endeavours to facilitate cohesion 
and consensus within the European Council. In addition, he represents the 
Union in its dealings with the outside world, at the level of the Heads of 
State or Government, in matters of common foreign and security policy, 
without prejudice to the powers of the High Representative of the Union 
and, I would add, ‘or to those of the President of the Commission’. The 
Union’s international representation at the highest level actually requires 
the presence of both Presidents, and also the High Representative, 
particularly as foreign policy has a strong economic dimension and, in turn, 
security extends far beyond the narrow concept of military security, and 
tends to encompass economic, social and cultural activities as well as 
scientific and technological activities. Although the European Council acts 
by consensus, confidence gained as a result of cooperating in practice 
should enable it to gradually extend the scope of qualified majority voting. 
As a result of these new powers and through the actions of its President, 
the European Council is already reinforcing intergovernmental power within 
the Union. 
 
A dual presidency within a Community system 
In the case of the dual presidency, governmental authority is exercised on 
the basis of two institutional pillars: on the one hand the European Council 
and its right hands, namely the Councils, and on the other hand the 
European Executive, embodied by the European Commission. With its 
permanent President, the European Council has assumed full responsibility 
for the general strategies and guidelines defined in the basic text. In the 
future, close collaboration between the two Presidents and the High 
Representative will probably be imposed by de facto interdependence 
between economic and monetary policies and external relations, including 
security and defence. As a result, even in these political matters par 
excellence, at some point in the future the European Council will probably 
become responsible for these decisions, acting on a proposal from the 
Commission and the General Affairs Council. That at least is my prediction, 
which aims to guarantee, using the Community method, optimum 
coherence according to the European public interest.  
For its part, Foreign Affairs will require joint action by the Foreign Affairs 
Council, chaired by the High Representative, and the Commission. In the 
long term, the Community method will tend to become more widely used, 
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guaranteeing efficiency and ensuring democratic control by the European 
Parliament over the Commission and its Vice-President. At the moment, 
the relationship between the two Presidents seems to be moving towards a 
tandem vital to the smooth running of the Union, based on the division of 
tasks. However, the situation is not as clear with regard to the relationship 
between President Herman Van Rompuy and the rotating Council 
presidencies.  
 
On the Council 
Confusion or separation of powers? 
Together with the Commission, the Council plays a key role in the decision-
making process of the European Community. It forms the final stage in the 
legislative process under the codecision procedure with the European 
Parliament. Its dual role in the adoption of legislative acts and common 
policies proposed by the Commission and its governmental authority, which 
it often shares with the Commission, reinforce its position within the 
Community system. On the other hand, the proliferation of specialised 
Councils undermines its coherence and hinders the rotating presidency in 
its task of coordination. Like Janus, it has two faces, one with legislative 
power and the other with governmental authority.  
With the extension of the sovereign areas of the European Union, the 
Council has become, together with the European Council, the main holder 
of the new powers conferred on the Union under the CFSP. In fact it lies at 
the very heart of the debate on the intergovernmental or Community nature 
of the European Union. Its inherent ambiguity is due to the fact that it not 
only escapes control by the European Parliament when acting as the 
Community legislature, which is only natural, but also when it takes 
governmental decisions, which is less so. Paradoxically, the Commission, 
which proposes, is subject to the democratic control of the European 
Parliament whereas the Council, which decides, escapes any 
parliamentary control. Is it not often said that Montesquieu has not yet 
made a detour via Brussels? 
In the Union’s legislative process, the Commission makes proposals and 
tries to maintain both the consistency and the balance of Community 
legislation. It has a tool for this purpose: the requirement for unanimity in 
the Council for any amendment to its proposal, which the Commission 
alone is authorised to make. As the source of European legislation, its 
scope of operation has expanded in line with the extension of codecision 
powers. This point has often been omitted in recent assessments of the 
division of powers. Legislative codecision has gradually been extended, 
The Treaty of Lisbon or intergovernmental temptation?                                                                                     7 
increasing the power of the Commission and the European Parliament, and 
also the functional capacity of the Council due to the extension of qualified 
majority voting. It is logical to wonder whether we are not heading towards 
a bicameral legislative power. This dual participation of the Member States 
and Union citizens is evidence of the move towards a federative system. 
Without creating a ‘legislative Council’4, the Treaty has kept the distinction 
between the two functions of the Council, with the legislative function being 
carried out in total transparency. However, the Council’s ambivalence has 
been accentuated in that it now has more governmental functions in the 
foreign policy area. The confusion of powers remains the fundamental 
problem of the Council. 
 
A leap forward: a new voting procedure  
A double qualified majority is defined as at least 55 % of Council members 
representing 65 % of the Union’s population. It reflects the federative 
principle of the dual representation of Member States and citizens. This 
procedure applies when the Council acts on a proposal from the 
Commission, which shows the trust enjoyed by the Commission. On the 
other hand, if the initiative stems from one or more Member States, the 
majority required is 72 % of members representing 65 % of the population. 
This new rule takes account of the population criterion and underlines the 
importance of proposals made by the Commission or High Representative5. 
In practice, the Council votes only rarely; instead it tries to reach decisions 
by consensus. However, qualified majority voting avoids paralysis and 
helps to speed up the reconciliation of positions and decision-making. It 
also helps to increase the system’s capacity, while moving it towards a 
federative community. 
 
On the Community institutions  
The European Parliament: the big winner 
The European Parliament has emerged stronger, thus giving the Union a 
more democratic dimension. Its legislative function under the codecision 
procedure with the Council has been extended to around 50 new areas 
requiring proposals to be made by the Commission. Its legislative powers 
are comparable to those of the Council. The same is true on budgetary 
matters, where it has decision-making rights equal to those of the Council. 
4 The German government made proposals based on the ideas of Karl Lamers and Wolfang 
Schäuble, CDU/CSU-Fraktion des Deutschen Bundestages, Bonn, 1 September 1994.  
5 At the insistence of Poland, this procedure will take effect, following a further delay, in 2014, 
with an additional transitional period to 31 March 2017.  
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Moreover, its powers of political control over the Commission and its 
President have been consolidated. After hearing the candidate for 
President of the Commission proposed by the European Council, the 
European Parliament elects the President by an absolute majority of its 
members. It also organises hearings of future Commissioners, before 
investing the College as a whole. Its authority has therefore been 
reinforced. However, the main advance is still the extent of its legislative 
codecision power and its influence over the Commission, of which it is also 
the natural ally. The best evidence of this progress towards a federative 
democracy is, firstly, the importance afforded by the Commission and the 
Council to the European Parliament and, secondly, the fact that it has 
become the target of interest groups and lobbyists. These are all indicators 
of the increased power that the European Parliament now has. 
 
What about the Commission, the driving force of the Union? 
As a unique and independent institution, the Commission enjoys the right of initiative 
and proposal, together with supervision and management powers. It is the only 
institution invested with active powers of initiative, which has responsibility for 
identifying and guaranteeing the European public interest. As the legislative 
codecision procedure has been extended the Commission has seen its own scope 
for proposal expanded. The Commission actually plays a pivotal role in legislative 
matters due to its right of proposal, the consequences of which include the 
extension of qualified majority voting to the Council. However, it has been reduced 
to a rather marginal role in the CFSP and in the CSDP, where the 
intergovernmental method and unanimity are the rule. On the other hand, in Justice 
and Home Affairs, the Commission has been given more direct responsibility.  
As the main driving force of integration, its role is to assume governance of 
the Union. Quite clearly, it is the only institution consisting of full-time 
members with active power, and enjoying sufficient independence to 
counteract the national interests represented by the Councils and to assert 
the European interest. It is the main guarantor of overall cohesion within 
the Union. In order to maintain its role after enlargement and reinforce its 
collective responsibility and efficiency, the Treaty of Lisbon in particular 
limits the number of its members to 15 from 2014. Overall, it exercises 
political responsibility through its ‘small’ administration6. 
In its approach, which mainly involves consulting experts and the main 
stakeholders, the Commission looks for balanced solutions that are as 
6 The Commission’s administration is small compared to national administrations, and even 
regional or metropolitan administrations.  
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objective as possible and that protect the interests of the small and 
medium-sized Member States, while taking account of those of the large 
Member States. This statement explains the attachment of the former to 
the independent role assumed by the Commission, as these States find it 
more difficult to assert their interests in intergovernmental structures that 
are generally dominated by the large Member States. With this in mind, 
the Treaty of Lisbon includes a series of articles which aim to reinforce 
the authority of the President and the collective responsibility of the 
Commission.  
Furthermore, the Commission’s key role is apparent in the relationship 
between its right of proposal and qualified majority voting. The 
Commission’s right of proposal, taking into account the balance between 
the interests of countries and sectors of activity, has helped to extend 
qualified majority voting. The Commission now has a more direct basis of 
legitimacy, which results from the greater involvement of the European 
Parliament and European political formations in the choice of its President, 
through hearings and the investiture of the Commission. 
The Treaty of Lisbon has consolidated and expanded the role of the 
President, whose dual legitimacy stems from his nomination by the 
European Council acting by qualified majority and his election by the 
European Parliament7. The European Council takes account of the results 
of the European Parliament elections and conducts ‘appropriate 
consultations’ before proposing a candidate to the European Parliament. In 
turn, Parliament elects the President of the Commission by a majority of its 
component members. On 16 September 2009 the European Parliament 
resulting from the European elections on 7 June 2009 elected José Manuel 
Barroso by a majority of 382 votes. The President decides on the internal 
organisation of the Commission, ensuring that it acts consistently, 
efficiently and as a collegiate body. He therefore has the power to appoint 
Vice-Presidents, other than the High Representative of the Union, who is 
appointed by qualified majority by the European Council with the 
agreement of the President of the Commission. In addition, the Treaty of 
Lisbon has consolidated his authority by giving him the power to lay down 
guidelines within which the Commission is to work. As regards collective 
responsibility, individual statements by Commissioners have on two 
occasions harmed the authority and credibility of the Commission.8 
7 The European Council of 19 June 2009 unanimously supported José Manuel Barroso for a 
second term.  
8 Compare with the unilateral and sometimes contradictory statements made by members of 
the Conseil fédéral suisse (Swiss Federal Council), which have harmed the government’s 
authority. Similar situations can be observed in other Member States. 
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The Barroso II Commission composed of 27 members should be reduced in 
the future, based on a system of equal rotation, to a core of 15 decision-
making members. Does this equal rotation of Member States in the allocation 
of Commissioners not risk weakening the Commission and, at the same 
time, the Community method? The members from Malta or Cyprus will be the 
decision-makers just as often as the members from Germany or France. 
Good sense has prevailed, as this reduction stipulated by the Treaty may be 
amended by the European Council acting unanimously, thus opening the 
way to a mini-reform, which could form a precedent for the future.  
 
A rapidly expanding area: the CFSP and the CSDP 
Responsibility for taking fundamental decisions under the CFSP and the 
CSDP, which involves a specific procedure, should lie, in a federative 
context, with the European Council acting on a proposal from the High 
Representative and – as often as possible – jointly with the Commission. 
The consistency and efficiency of external policy depend, to a large extent, 
on joint proposals being made by the High Representative and the 
Commission, in close cooperation with the Foreign Affairs Council chaired 
by the High Representative. In this way discussions would be held on a 
proposal based on a common vision. In addition, in this configuration, 
democratic control would be exercised by the European Parliament, before 
which the Commission is fully responsible.  
The division of tasks in the Union corresponds to the need for the appropriate 
level of political power and democratic control: the more that problems fall 
within the area of high politics, the more the European Council’s commitment 
will be needed, but I hope that this commitment will be based on the 
Commission’s proposals, as the only institution responsible before the 
European Parliament. Quite clearly, without any European Council, there can 
be no genuine external policy; without any coherent strategy between the 
President of the European Council, the Commission and the authority of its 
President and Vice-President, there can be no Union speaking with one 
voice and acting in common under the scrutiny of the European Parliament. 
In my view, the individual initiatives and steps taken by one member, 
whatever its political weight, or by a group of members should be channelled 
through proposals made by the High Representative acting jointly with the 
Commission and according to the guidelines and framework decisions of the 
European Council. These are the unavoidable conditions for a genuinely 
common foreign and security policy9. 
9 This objective is implicit in the Treaty of Lisbon. 
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The key role of the High Representative 
In line with the Franco-German proposal, the European Minister of Foreign 
Affairs, who has now become the High Representative, relies on a 
European diplomatic service bringing together the Commission’s 
Directorate-General for External Relations and the Council’s Directorate-
General. This set-up merges the post of former High Representative with 
that of Commissioner for External Relations. Moreover, it marks the 
emergence of a European diplomatic service responsible for implementing 
the Union’s foreign and security policy. Consisting of one-third national 
diplomats together with officials from the Council and the Commission, this 
independent service comes under the authority of the High Representative. 
The Union’s main handicap remains the gap between Community affairs 
and common foreign, security and defence affairs. The High 
Representative is intended to fill this gap. In these sovereign areas, the 
Commission has traditionally had a more unobtrusive role. A modicum of 
progress has been made: the High Representative, together with the 
Commission, has the power to present proposals in his or her own name or 
on behalf of the Commission. As a result, the door has been opened to 
more responsibility before the European Parliament. However, the fact 
remains that, in these sensitive areas, unanimity is still strictly required, 
with the President of the European Council and the President of the 
Foreign Affairs Council having the task of facilitating consensus. We can 
therefore expect them to try to keep the deliberations in the institutional 
context and avoid any bypassing by certain Member States using outside 
channels. The large Member States with diplomatic and military capability 
tend to assume leadership in CFSP and CSDP matters. The war in Iraq 
has split both the large and the small and medium-sized Member States10. 
These divisions reveal the arduous task facing the High Representative. 
Incidentally, there is a certain ambiguity to the dual loyalty of the High 
Representative, who, although Vice-President of the Commission, is not 
subject to collective responsibility. Clearly, in the event of a motion of 
censure, the High Representative will resign collectively as a member of 
the College, but will remain in the position of President of the Foreign 
Affairs Council. For the time being, Baroness Ashton has kept her office in 
the Commission on the 12th floor of the Berlaymont building. During her 
hearing, she confirmed her loyalty to Europe and the Union. However, it will 
still be necessary to carefully observe how she pursues her European 
socialisation after a brief experience as Commissioner responsible for trade 
10 Unlike the full-on opposition between France and Germany during the implosion of Yugosla-
via, on this occasion the Franco-German pairing has found itself in the camp of opponents to 
the war on Iraq.  
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policy. Will the performance of full-time European duties contribute to 
Europeanisation and the formation of a Eurosphere11? Unlike the Permanent 
Representatives, the High Representative has a dual role as President of the 
Foreign Affairs Council and Vice-President of the European Commission 
and, in this respect, she has a dual European mandate.12    
The increased decision-making and implementing capacity needed by the 
European Union should allow it to become a major player and a legislative 
force in a multipolar world, together with the United States, Russia and 
Japan as well as the emerging powers of China, India and Brazil. However, 
it will still need to develop a bolder strategy, particularly with regard to its 
old ally, the United States, but also towards Russia and Ukraine. As re-
emerging powers, these countries also have in common with the European 
Union their cultural and geographic proximity and their increasing ‘de facto 
solidarity’. In order to speak in unison in this changing world, the Union 
must rely on the impetus of the High Representative and the Commission, 
as well as on the support of the European Council and its President. That is 
why we need to gradually resort to the Community method. 
 
The Union during the running-in period 
Two issues have drawn my attention: the establishment of the European 
External Action Service (EEAS), and the fundamental issue of the 
interweaving of the responsibilities of President Van Rompuy and the High 
Representative within the Union system, as well as their relations with 
President Barroso and the European Commission. Only the operation in 
practice of the troika will allow us to assess its effects. However, for the 
time being, it is clear that their close collaboration and their mutual trust will 
be decisive for the future of the Union. 
It should firstly be noted that the High Representative is overloaded with 
many tasks and that she will have to rely to a great extent on the 
Commission and on the EEAS13, which comes under her authority. This is 
particularly the case as her very broad mandate includes conducting the 
CFSP, including the CSDP, and ensuring the consistency of the Union’s 
external action. In this context, the EEAS is responsible for assisting the 
two Presidents, the Commission and the High Representative. Led by 
11 The expression belongs to Jacques-René Rabier, Honorary Director-General at the Com-
mission.  
12 In our previous studies, we noted that, although being representatives of the Member Sta-
tes, they are also spokespersons for the Union within their governments. They therefore have 
a dual loyalty: national and European.  
13 Council Decision of 26 July 2010 establishing the organisation and functioning of the Euro-
pean External Action Service.  
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Pierre Vimont, Executive Secretary General, assisted by two Deputy 
Secretary Generals, Helga Schmid and Maciej Popowski, and also by 
David Sullivan, Chief Operating Officer, the European External Action 
Service works in collaboration with the diplomatic services of the Member 
States, and also with the General Secretariat of the Council and the 
Commission departments. It is responsible for ensuring the consistency of 
the Union’s external action. This action includes a series of external aid 
instruments managed by the Commission in the areas of cooperation, 
neighbourhood and partnership, as well as nuclear safety, stability 
instruments and instruments for democracy and human rights. That is why 
the dual role of the High Representative is so important.  
Another innovation concerns the 132 Commission delegations, which have 
become Union delegations. The Heads of Delegation receive their 
instructions from the High Representative and from the EEAS, as well as 
from the Commission in its areas of responsibility. One of the 
consequences of this new organisation of the European diplomatic service 
is that meetings of the Member States’ ambassadors are now chaired by 
the Head of Delegation instead of the Head of Mission of the country 
assuming the rotating presidency of the Council. The Union is seeking at all 
levels to reinforce the consistency and efficiency of its external action. 
As regards collaboration between the two Presidents, this is developing 
promisingly. A gentleman’s agreement was concluded between the two 
Presidents, who have taken to starting their weeks by breakfasting 
together. Initial evidence of their collaboration is also provided by their 
complementary participation and intervention at G-8 and G-20 meetings14.  
 
The ambiguous role of the task force15 
A minor obstacle threatens to disrupt this harmony between the two leaders 
of the Union: in order to facilitate the recovery from the financial and 
economic crisis, the European Council decided that it would be a good idea 
to create a task force under the presidency of Herman Van Rompuy. 
Looking at this in more detail, we can see that it involves informal meetings 
between the Finance Ministers, together with Olli Rehn, Commissioner, 
Jean-Claude Trichet, President of the ECB, and Jean-Claude Juncker, 
President of the Eurogroup. Generally speaking, a task force consists of 
either a limited number of relevant Ministers, or high-level experts. To my 
14 See, for example, the joint letter on the eve of the G-20 summit in Seoul, which was asses-
sed by the European Council on 28-29 October 2010.  
15 The impact of the financial and economic crisis on the implementation of the new treaty is 
profound: change in priorities, direct intervention of the German Chancellor and French Presi-
dent, marginalisation of the Commission despite its substantial contribution.  
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knowledge, Presidents of States or official organisations do not assume the 
presidency of a task force. On the other hand, the task force is taking its 
decisions and directing its actions based on the conclusions of working 
groups. Is it right for a senior politician to undertake to chair such informal 
working groups? Should he not protect his high position and independent 
choice?  
The question is whether the task force is encroaching upon the powers of the 
Commission and whether the intergovernmental method is not seeking to 
impose itself upon the Community method. Personally speaking, I would 
have preferred a task force chaired by the Commissioner for Economic and 
Financial Affairs, which was responsible for drawing up a comprehensive 
anti-crisis programme based on analyses and proposals from the 
Commission. It should be acknowledged, however, that President Van 
Rompuy, whose willingness to serve Europe is not in question, is trying to 
find his bearings by taking various initiatives. He needs to assert himself by 
showing evidence of dynamism and initiative. However, the fact remains that, 
to avoid creating an atmosphere of competition or giving the impression of 
tipping the balance towards the intergovernmental institutions at the expense 
of the Commission, it would be advisable for any new initiative to be 
launched in agreement with the Commission President.  
The European Council on 28 and 29 October 2010 demonstrated the tangle 
of initiatives, which have overall produced some good results. The task 
force’s report was adopted, which was based on the Commission’s proposals 
in numerous respects. The ‘reversed majority’ is intended to ensure that 
sanctions are automatically applied to a certain extent, if budgetary deficits 
and levels of public debt are exceeded inordinately. In principle, sanctions 
will be applied unless the Council votes to the contrary by qualified majority. 
President Van Rompuy insisted on the automatic application of sanctions. 
The Franco-German driving force, through the impetus of the German 
Chancellor, has suggested the idea of a ‘minor reform’ of the Treaty of 
Lisbon in order to give the anti-crisis fund a permanent and legal basis. The 
stabilisation fund planned to last for three years must now be included 
within the Treaty of Lisbon. The Franco-German pairing has succeeded in 
drawing other Member States into its plan. Aware of the need for a 
permanent mechanism, all have accepted, with a few grumbles, this step 
towards economic governance. A dual mandate has been given to the task 
force and to the Commission, which requested this on its own initiative. In 
actual fact, we now have two road maps, which overlap and complement 
each other at the same time. On the one hand we have a series of 
proposals from the Commission: reinforcement of financial surveillance, 
establishment of anti-crisis mechanisms, but also the relaunch of the 
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internal market and the implementation of the 2010 strategy, together with 
other initiatives such as the reform of the European budget, the proposal to 
launch EU project bonds and to increase the resources of the European 
Stabilization Fund. In short, these are anti-crisis measures coupled with a 
programme for growth. On the other hand we have a top-level approach, 
through the mandate given by the European Council to the task force of 
President Van Rompuy. This approach is the reverse of the Community 
method, as it starts by consulting the governments and their Finance 
Ministers. A closer look reveals that this approach is based on the work and 
initiatives of the Commission, represented within the task force by the 
Commissioner responsible for Economic Affairs, and also on the 
contribution of the President of the ECB and the President of the 
Eurogroup. This approach actually takes a new and complex path, watched 
over by the President of the European Council. Is this a transitional 
procedure or will it become more long-term? In the first case, it is justified, 
whereas, in the second case, it represents a slippery slope towards the 
intergovernmental method. 
The European Council has called for the rapid implementation of legislative 
instruments. This marks a return to the Community method, which is based 
on Commission proposals. At the same time, based on a traditional 
procedure, the European Council has set deadlines so that the Council and 
the European Parliament reach agreement on the Commission’s legislative 
proposals before the summer of 2011.  
As for the mini-reform establishing a permanent crisis management 
mechanism, the European Council has called on its President to consult its 
members about preparing a necessary but ‘limited amendment’, without 
altering Article 125 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
(‘no bail-out’ clause). Following approval, the mini-reform consisting of the 
permanent mechanism could be ratified by mid-2013 at the latest. To 
speed up the process of establishing this crisis mechanism, would it not be 
opportune to resort to ‘enhanced cooperation’? At the same time, the 
Council notes with satisfaction that the Commission intends to undertake, 
in close consultation with the President of the European Council, 
preparatory work on the general components of the new mechanism to be 
established, in particular the role of the private sector, the role of the IMF 
and the very strict conditions imposed on actions carried out under this type 
of instrument. In this obsession with the crisis and sanctions, have we not 
forgotten incentives, coordinated development programmes and European 
investment in infrastructure? Sanctions only make sense if they contribute 
through incentives to promoting growth and employment recovery. I would 
highlight the following points: the capacity of the Franco-German pairing to 
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boost recovery, the continued activities of the task force and its President, 
and the unavoidable role of the Commission and the return to the use of 
deadlines16. 
In this procedural mix where the roles of the two Presidents and the 
intergovernmental and Community methods have become confused, it is 
difficult and premature to assess the contribution of each one. Although the 
initiatives are shared between the Commission, the task force and the 
Franco-German pairing, the results with regard to the contents of the 
European Council decisions are generally positive. The ‘weighty’ tasks and 
the preparation and approval of legislative rules come under the 
Commission’s right of proposal and the codecision procedure of the Council 
and the European Parliament. We can understand why, faced with this 
complexity, the President of the European Council has stated that the 
Community/intergovernmental issue is a false problem resulting in a false 
argument. While respecting the opinion of the President of the European 
Council, I strongly refute this view. The long experience of the European 
Community, and the more recent experience of the European Union, confirm 
the efficiency of the Community method, which is an original characteristic of 
the European Union. This institutional invention differentiates the European 
Union from international organisations and associates it with federative-type 
communities, provided that the balance of powers and institutions is 
respected. Moreover, it ensures democratic control by the European 
Parliament of the Commission’s activities, unlike the Council and the 
intergovernmental method, which escape any responsibility before the 
European Parliament. 
Furthermore, the Community method is the only one that allows 
participatory democracy. When drawing up its proposals, the Commission 
does not limit itself to questioning governments, but also consults 
socioeconomic participants. The advantage of a proposal being submitted 
for Council approval is clear: it places, on the discussion table, a document 
which presents a view of the European common interest and which takes 
account of the balance between various national interests and between the 
large, medium-sized and small Member States. Conversely, 
intergovernmental procedures are more at risk of being dominated by the 
large Member States.  
In terms of external relations, the example is provided by trade policy, 
where the interests of the Union are represented by the Commission. In 
various areas of external policy, this role has been devolved to the High 
16 Will the German government, followed by the French one, succeed in imposing its model 
and the unionist method? Its new intergovernmental approach is in total contradiction with its 
traditional European federalist behaviour and spirit. .  
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Representative, together with the two Presidents. Using the Community 
method, making proposals jointly with the Commission and relying on the 
European diplomatic service, the High Representative can increase the 
Union’s capacity to have an international influence.  
In this transitional phase, each initiative and each statement influence 
European commitment and the activity of various stakeholders. It is 
therefore essential for the presidential tandem to assert itself with 
determination as the new face and spokesperson of the Union, in concert 
with the High Representative. This seems to be the aim of the Treaty of 
Lisbon. Incidentally, each act of President Van Rompuy and President 
Barroso has repercussions well beyond the sphere of the European 
institutions and helps, both symbolically and practically, to forge the image 
of the European Union and confirm its influence among the global players.   
 
Open conclusion on the future 
Quite clearly, the new Treaty has made a qualitative leap forward, which 
is all the more significant as it has occurred at a time when Europe is 
struggling to pull out of the crisis. Various lessons can be learnt from this 
test of the Union’s solidity. The crisis with the euro and the dynamic core, 
under pressure from public and private debts, and the risk of a domino 
effect highlighted by Greece’s difficulties are all factors which have called 
into question the ‘irreversible’ process of integration and the positive 
spillover theorised by Haas. The crisis is having a dual effect: it is 
arousing national interests, while necessarily imposing common solutions. 
As in the past, the need and the desire for Europe are stronger than the 
trials and tribulations of globalisation and the external shocks or internal 
tensions.    
Multiple collaboration networks and intense communication in particular by 
means of internet are in turn helping to maintain the rhythm and progress, 
albeit fluctuating but steady, towards more Union. In this complex context, 
the Community or federal method, combined with the new means of 
communication and governance, ensures the independence of the Member 
States, regions, towns and local authorities in interaction with other social 
players, at the same time as it ensures their participation by reinforcing the 
Union. In this environment, the Commission is intended to listen to the 
diverse voices and opinions, develop guidelines and identify common 
objectives. However, it will still need to perform its role to the full. 
At this point in time, we can only say that the new Treaty is continuing, with 
a few exceptions such as the forming of a dominant core, the quest for an 
unprecedented European federation. However, only its operation in 
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practice will allow its effective contribution to the federative future of the 
European Union to be assessed. Quite clearly, the Treaty of Lisbon offers 
new instruments, which, if used to the full, are bearers of high hopes and a 
sign of Europe’s great ambition.  
Since the beginnings of the ECSC, the High Authority and then the 
Commission of the European Community followed by the European Union 
have highlighted the irreplaceable role of this independent institution, which 
is the European driving force of the integration process and the guarantor 
of the common treaties and rules. It is the key institution which, together 
with the European Parliament and the Court of Justice, and with the 
support of the European Council and the Council, has responsibility for 
promoting the public interest in a European context. The Treaty of Lisbon 
offers new means that are currently being run in and whose full use, in the 
spirit of the Community method, will be decisive if the Union is to progress 
towards an unprecedented form of European federation. The Treaty of 
Lisbon brings with it great hope for the future. 
